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An Infamous Legacy: Schlieffen's Military Theories Revisited

By Antulio J. Echevarria II

Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1905, is among the most infamous of Germany's military figures. Historians have criticized him for having designed the ill-fated war plan Germany used in 1914, the so-called Schlieffen Plan. Aimed at destroying the French Army with one great enveloping maneuver through Belgium and northern France, that plan was hopelessly flawed from the start, critics have maintained. For one thing, it relied on an offensive solution when, for the previous twenty-five years, technological advances had apparently favored the defense. Second, it called for several more corps than the German Army possessed. Third, it required strict adherence to a rigid timetable that not only deprived subordinate commanders of freedom of action but overlooked the inevitably disruptive influence of the fog and friction of war. Finally, it spurned all political guidance in favor of a purely military solution to Germany's strategic dilemma, one that attempted to elevate a tactical principle, envelopment, to the level of strategy. Consequently, for historians and strategists alike, Schlieffen's name has been tied to a legacy of military thinking at its worst, a vision that appeared myopic, mechanical, and obsessive.[1]

However, recent scholarship concerning both Schlieffen's ideas and the underpinnings of the German war plan of 1914 reveals a different story. We now understand that Schlieffen's thinking both reflected and contributed to a general intellectual transition that occurred in all European armies, as well as in the U.S. Army, before the First World War. Moreover, some historians have recently shown that the traditional understanding of the so-called Schlieffen Plan may require considerable revision.

The *Gesamtschlacht*

Schlieffen's series of Cannae essays, published in the German General Staff's *Quarterly for Tactics and Military Science* between 1909 and 1913 and later as a collected volume, has been wrongly viewed as the culmination of his military thought. These historical essays appear to demonstrate Schlieffen's preoccupation, if not obsession, with the doctrine of a

Field Marshal von Schlieffen, © Corbis

battle of annihilation (*Vernichtungsschlacht*), the idea of cutting off and destroying an opponent's army in one major battle–by means of an envelopment.[2] While Schlieffen did write that flank attacks were the "essence" of all military history and he did consider Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae in 216 B.C. a work of genius, the Cannae essays actually amount to little more than a series of case studies illustrating how envelopments could have achieved decisive results for the battles of 1866 and 1870.[3] These case studies, though popular at the time, no more reflect the complexity of Schlieffen's ideas than the brief "Instructions to the Crown Prince" mirrors the richness of Clausewitz's views.

Instead, Schlieffen's essay "War in the Present Day," published in 1909, reveals much more about his general concept of modern warfare.[4] This concept is accurately captured in the German term *Gesamtschlacht*, or overall battle, which reflected Schlieffen's view that all engagements, whether large or small, planned or spontaneous, contribute to the development of the overall theater battle.[5] Efforts on one wing—whether active or passive—affect those on the other. A defensive action by one corps, for example, should enable another to move forward. If successful, both efforts together contribute to the desired outcome of the campaign as a whole. In other words, Schlieffen's view reflects a new way of looking at battle itself, one in which the relevant activities are not confined to a single field, but span an entire theater.

In reaching this understanding, Schlieffen was not alone. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, soldiers had seen battle in the Napoleonic fashion, that is, as a discrete, often climactic act that took place within the confines of a single field, as at Waterloo, Königgrätz, or Sedan. By the late 1890s, however, military writers throughout Europe and the United States generally agreed that the battlefield had grown much larger and more lethal since Napoleon's day and, indeed, even since Germany's victory over France in 1871. The armies that took the field in the next general war would have millions—rather than hundreds of thousands—of men in uniform. They would amount to virtual "nations in arms." Under such circumstances, army size alone would preclude any possibility of ending the war through a single, decisive stroke. Under this new paradigm, military leaders viewed battle less as a discrete act and more as a composite of various concurrent and interconnected actions that would extend across the entire theater of war. Individual actions (and reactions) might affect the overall battle in very disproportionate ways. Events in one sector, however large or remote, could lead to victory or defeat in another. In addition, the phenomenon of war itself was viewed more comprehensively, with its social, political, and economic effects often discussed in the military literature of the day.[6]

In this vein, "War in the Present Day" discussed how new technologies and developments—such as smokeless powder, magazine rifles, machine guns, rapid-firing artillery, million-man armies, and modern fortifications and entrenchments—had given great advantages to the defense. The tactical problem of the day had become how to close with and defeat an opponent without being destroyed in the process. Attacking troops would only be able to advance in dispersed order, dashing from one piece of cover to the next, while a heavy fire kept the defenders' heads down. The attacker might even have to dig successive lines of trenches, pushing forward trench by trench, as in fortress warfare. He might also have to restrict his forward movement to periods of darkness. With such

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techniques it could take days or weeks to drive an attack home, and, as Schlieffen pointed out, such attacks were unlikely to yield decisive results. The defender could simply fall back to another position and force the attacker to repeat the laborious process all over again.[7] Indeed, the strength of the defense was such that the next war could well develop into a strategically "indecisive" clash of masses.[8] Thus, "War in the Present Day" reveals that Schlieffen had indeed appreciated the difficulties confronting offensive maneuver on the eve of the First World War.

To overcome such difficulties, Schlieffen argued that an attacker would require a well-coordinated system of fire and movement executed so as to envelop one, or both, of the defender's flanks. Suppressive fire would play as important a role in tomorrow's battles as destructive fire had played in those of Napoleon. In light of the lethality of the modern battlefield, Schlieffen saw envelopments as more than a way to put a large number of an opponent's troops "in the bag." They provided a means to achieve operational, if not strategic, decisiveness in a tactical environment that favored the defense. They also offered a way to maintain a high tempo of activity across the front that might suffice to dislocate the defender. By maintaining a fluid, continuously unfolding attack—a series of left jabs and right hooks—Schlieffen hoped to keep the enemy off balance and prevent him from establishing a deliberate defense that would lead to a protracted campaign.

Yet Schlieffen also acknowledged that successful envelopments generally required considerable numerical superiority, an advantage that, in the era of million-man armies, neither side was likely to enjoy. Hence, he pointed to the example of Hannibal's Cannae—where the center was thinned in order to free up greater numbers of troops for the wings. In Schlieffen's view, the power of modern firearms made the risk of a weakened center acceptable. Also, Germany's growing fleet of dirigible airships, which provided enhanced vision of the battlefield and could deliver it faster than had traditional cavalry reconnaissance, offered the possibility of locating the enemy's flanks quickly. Schlieffen thus sought to take advantage of modern technologies, putting them into the service of offensive maneuver. In short, Schlieffen saw turning movements or envelopments as merely a means to an end. They threatened an enemy's lines of

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

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communication and could turn him out of his position and restore the possibility of forward movement. Yet they were also to be used in conjunction with other means, such as frontal attacks and penetrations.[9]

If the larger, more lethal battlefield posed serious tactical difficulties for an attacker, it presented even greater problems for his command and control. As Schlieffen pointed out, the sheer size of the modern battle area would prevent a military commander from overseeing it firsthand. No modern commander could, therefore, direct events as Napoleon had done. Instead, the "modern Alexander" would have to position himself well to the rear and employ the latest communication and transportation technologies to convey his orders to the front. Even then, his ability to influence events would remain limited. He would have to decentralize his command authority—delegating tasks and resources—and then rely upon the initiative and professional judgment of his subordinate commanders to get the job done.[10]

Schlieffen's answer to the challenges of commanding large units under modern conditions was thus not unlike the basically "hands-off" approach of the elder Moltke, his predecessor as chief of the German General Staff. Schlieffen fully expected his subordinate commanders to act on their own initiative, striving constantly to disrupt, spoil, or preempt their opponents' preparations. To be sure, time was not on Schlieffen's side, and that precluded extending complete freedom of action to his subordinates. Whereas in 1866 and 1870–71 Moltke could afford to wait for his opponent to make a mistake, half a century later Schlieffen needed a means to induce his adversaries into committing errors that he could exploit. He had to prevent the enemy from adopting a defensive posture and drawing the German Army into a stalemate, as that would ultimately prove disastrous. The Entente did not have to fight an offensive war to defeat the Central Powers, though it intended to do so. It merely had to dig in behind defensive fieldworks and, aided by a naval blockade, to strangle the Central Powers slowly.

In many respects, "War in the Present Day" represents Schlieffen's response to the arguments of Europe's turn-of-the-century socialists and pacifists, men like the Pole Jan Bloch, whose multivolume study concluded that modern weapons and developments had rendered war too costly and indecisive to serve as an effective instrument of policy.[11] Schlieffen agreed that a protracted war would present an almost impossible social and economic burden, leading ultimately to popular unrest and the disruption of trade and industry, perhaps even to revolution. He did not assume that the next war would be short but instead warned his officers that the character of modern war was such that military operations could easily slip into positional warfare. Such a war would undoubtedly mean economic ruin for Germany. Yet the possibility of such an outcome only underscored the need for a revolution in tactics and battlefield control in order to avoid such a stalemate.[12]

The Schlieffen Plan

Perhaps no war plan has been shrouded in as much confusion as the infamous Schlieffen Plan. Unfortunately, space does not permit analyzing the plan here as thoroughly as it has been elsewhere. The most thorough—and perhaps the most misleading—analysis of the plan to date is Gerhard Ritter's *Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth*.[13] Ritter concluded that the plan was "never a sound formula for victory," but "a daring, indeed over-daring, gamble whose success depended upon many lucky accidents."[14] He condemned it as a symptom of rampant militarism, "a curse" that ultimately brought catastrophe to Germany and Europe. It has, Ritter concluded, since gone down in history as an example of operational thinking totally divorced from economic or political realities.[15]

To be sure, the writings of a number of General Staff officers, such as Lt. Col. Wolfgang Foerster and Generals Hermann von Kuhl, Erich Ludendorff, and Wilhelm Groener, created a fair amount of confusion with regard to the origins and development of the so-called Schlieffen Plan. In essence, they maintained that if Schlieffen's successor as chief of staff, the younger Moltke, had followed the initial concept, Germany would have reaped the fruits of victory in 1914, rather than the humiliation of defeat four years later.[16] However, these works simply represent attempts, in the aftermath of Germany's defeat, to protect the image of the General Staff as a whole at the expense of the younger Moltke, and they have little analytical value. In their defense of Schlieffen, these works also reflect the intense loyalty that his strong personality had engendered.[17]

Yet Ritter and the earlier German General Staff officers turned polemicists seem to have committed an egregious error by taking Schlieffen's *Denkschrift*

(concept paper) of 1905–06 for the basic outline of the Schlieffen Plan. Their discussion of this *Denkschrift* has confused subsequent historians who have come to see it as the genuine, if incomplete and fault-ridden, German war plan. In fact, *Denkschriften* were typically little more than analyses of "what-if" scenarios, and as such served to answer specific operational questions.[18] Many such concept papers were written before the First World War, and some did form the bases of war plans. However, the mature plans did not necessarily resemble the initial concept outlined in the *Denkschriften*. Nor did the concept papers contain the logistical and other details of a war plan.[19] Therefore, the *Denkschrift* of 1906 can no more be criticized as an incomplete war plan than a painter's preliminary sketch can be criticized as an unfinished painting.

Fortunately, thanks to recent scholarship, we now know that Schlieffen modified his approach to Germany's two-front strategic problem several times, switching the concentration of his forces between east and west when presented with different strategic situations.[20] During the war game of November–December 1905, for example, the largest game conducted to that point, Schlieffen assumed the strategic defensive on both fronts. He used the advantage of interior lines afforded by the excellent German rail network to defeat simultaneous attacks from the French and the Russians. Furthermore, Schlieffen's definition of a decisive victory here had little to do with the ideal of "total annihilation" described in the Cannae studies. Instead, decisive victory depended upon the ratio of forces left after the battle. In one case, for example, a decisive victory equated to the defeat of nine French corps, which would allow a corresponding number of German corps to be transferred to the east.[21]

Schlieffen also wanted to fight the French closer to the frontier than Ritter's infamous, and apparently misidentified, maps of the "Schieffen Plan" indicate, because he intended to make use of the strategic mobility that Germany's excellent rail system afforded. Indeed, while conclusive evidence is still lacking due to the destruction of the German military archives during Allied bombardment in 1945, Schlieffen's (and the younger Moltke's) overall intentions seem in fact to have been to win a decisive edge in the opening stages of the conflict, not, however, by means of one great Cannae but instead by a series of surprise flank attacks against an expected French offensive or counteroffensive. These envelopments were, moreover, to occur in the area between Paris and the Franco-Belgian frontier, rather than south of Paris. In fact, the envelopment of Paris was considered an option to be executed only if the French were to use their capital as the hinge of its defensive line or otherwise fall back too rapidly to be engaged decisively beforehand.[22]

In addition, Schlieffen made clear that, even if the Germans were successful in their initial campaign, they would still need to be prepared to launch a second offensive to defeat the expected People's War that would likely ensue, just as it had in 1871. In terms of its basic concept, the Schlieffen Plan followed the spirit of the elder Moltke, who had preached the value of the defensive-offensive—counterattacking an enemy who had already weakened himself against your defenses—and who had believed that to plan beyond the initial clash of forces amounted to sheer folly. Indeed, as other historians have noted, Schlieffen's thinking throughout this period showed a preference for the defensive-offensive.[23]

Moreover, Schlieffen's operational concept did not rest upon clockwork execution in accordance with a rigid timetable, as once believed. The traditional view of the plan is that movement had to be rapid and relentless in order to achieve the great-wheel flanking movement that would produce the Cannae of the French Army.[24] However, as the many *Denkschriften* reveal, the right wing's flanking movements were primarily designed to lend speed to the advance by keeping the French off balance with a series of right hooks. The overall scheme itself was contingent upon the success (or failure) of enemy and friendly actions. Perhaps the most important of these contingencies was the possible envelopment of Paris, which would occur only *if* the French did not launch an offensive of their own or chose not to stand and fight before or along the Oise and Aisne rivers. In fact, both Schlieffen and the younger Moltke seem to have considered it possible that the left wing, rather than the right, might deliver the decisive blow. Accordingly, the series of *Denkschriften* and associated war games produced before 1914 reflected a readiness to shift German forces between the north and south.[25]

In sum, whatever flaws existed in Schlieffen's military theories (and there were many), his concept of battle had clearly broken free of the Napoleonic paradigm. Like his contemporaries in the American, British, French, and Russian Armies, his conception of modern warfare was comprehensive and flexible.[26] Also, his approach to war planning adopted a modern perspective in that strategic requirements—at least with respect to land forces—drove first operational, and then tactical, approaches. This perspective, which in fact became fundamental to the development of force structures in the twentieth century, marked a decisive break from the Moltkean view that strategy was a system of *ad hoc* expedients. Advocates of this earlier view believed that tactical successes should *pull* strategy, as it were, rather than being *pushed* by it. Moltke, of course, had conducted his famous campaigns against Austria and France without having to worry about the problem of a war on two fronts. In a two-front war, the Moltkean approach might win a battle or even several battles, but win them too late for Germany to achieve an acceptable peace. It would not matter how many defeats the Germans inflicted on the French Army, if the Russians took Berlin.

Recent scholarship has shown that the Schlieffen Plan can no longer serve as an example of a war plan that was too rigid or too focused on operational details at the expense of political objectives. While those dangers remain important, historians and educators will have to look elsewhere for historical examples to illustrate them. Moreover, when speaking of Germany's war plan of 1914, educators will have to refer not to the so-called Schlieffen Plan (circa 1905), but rather to the younger Moltke's Plan (circa 1913–14), which, although similar to the former in many respects, was developed for a different strategic context, one that included a stronger Russia and a more involved Great Britain. Yet historians and instructors alike would do well to point out that Schlieffen's paradigm of warfare, where battle is no longer a discrete act but a composite of concurrent and interconnected actions, remains valid and useful today, especially since today's battlefields are becoming more extended and intertwined. One might even wish to conceive of some possible operations in terms of a global *Gesamtschlacht*.

That our understanding of Schlieffen's military thought can change speaks to the intrinsic dynamism of the historical process. Ritter's analysis, influenced by the catastrophic events of two world wars, now yields to a new perspective, one that is undoubtedly still imperfect but in different ways.

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NOTES

1. Stig Förster, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871–1914: Metakritik eines Mythos," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 54, no. 1 (1995): 61–95; Arden Bucholz, *Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning* (New York, 1991); Jehuda Wallach, *Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967); Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, 1986), pp. 296–325; Lothar Burchardt, "Operatives Denken und Planen von Schlieffen bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges," in Horst Boog et al., eds., *Operatives Denken und Handeln in deutschen Streitkräften im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte no. 9 (Herford, Germany, 1988), pp. 45–72.
2. Gerhard Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth*, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (New York, 1958), p. 72; Alfred von Schlieffen, *Cannae* (Berlin, 1925). The U.S. Army Command and General Staff School Press published an English translation of *Cannae* in 1931, and it has been twice reissued, most recently in 1992.
3. Ltr, Schlieffen to Hugo, Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, 18 Sep 1909, printed in Alfred von

Schlieffen, *Briefe*, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Göttingen, 1958), pp. 309–10.

4. Alfred von Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart," *Deutsche Revue* (January 1909): 13–24; Alfred von Schlieffen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1913), 1: 11–24; and Schlieffen, *Cannae*, pp. 273–83.

5. On the *Gesamtschlacht* see also Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945," in Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 532–33.

6. For examples, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, *After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War* (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), especially Chapter 7.

7. Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart," p. 14.

8. War History Branch, German Army General Staff, *Der Schlachterfolg, mit welchen Mitteln wurde er erstrebt?* Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik no. 3 (Berlin, 1903), p. 313.

9. Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart," pp. 15–16.

10. Ibid., pp. 15, 17–18.

11. Jan Bloch, *Budushchaia voina v tekhnicheskom, ekonomicheskom, politicheskom otnosheniiakh*, 6 vols. (St. Petersburg, Russia, 1898–99), translated into German as *Der Krieg. Uebersetzung des russischen Werkes des Autors: Der zukünftige Krieg in seiner technischen, volkswirtschaftlichen und politischen Bedeutung*, 6 vols. (Berlin, 1899). A single volume of this work appeared in English translation as *The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations: Is War Now Impossible?* (New York, 1899).

12. War History Branch, German Army General Staff, *Der Schlachterfolg*, pp. 312–13; Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart," pp. 14–15, 19–20, 22–24.

13. Ritter, *Der Schlieffenplan: Kritik eines Mythos* (Munich, 1956), translated into English as *The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth*. See also his *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1954–68), translated into English by Hans Norden as *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, 4 vols. (Coral Gables, Fla., 1969–73).

14. Ritter, *The Schlieffen Plan*, p. 66.

15. Ibid., pp. 88–90, with the quoted words on p. 88.

16. Wolfgang Foerster, *Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1921); Hermann Joseph von Kuhl, *Der deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920) and *Der Marnefeldzug 1914* (Berlin, 1921); Erich Ludendorff, *Kriegführung und Politik* (Berlin, 1922); Wilhelm Groener, *Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen: Operative Studien über den Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1927) and *Der Feldherr wider Willen: Operative Studien über den Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1930). See also Hugo, Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, *Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Schlieffen: Sein Leben und die Verwertung seines geisten Erbes im Weltkriege* (Leipzig, 1920); Friedrich von Boetticher, "Der Lehrmeister des neuzeitlichen Krieges," in Friedrich Ernst von Cochenhausen, ed., *Von Scharnhorst zu Schlieffen 1806–1906* (Berlin, 1933), pp. 249–316.

17. Bucholz, *Prussian War Planning*, pp. 129–32.

18. This is the argument of Terence Zuber, "The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered," *War in History* 6 (1999): 262–305, especially pp. 268–70, 293, 296. However, Zuber goes too far in suggesting that the Plan was merely a ruse to argue for an increase in army strength. Terence M. Holmes, "The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber's 'The Schlieffen Plan,'" *War in History* 8 (2001): 208–32, raises a number of good counter-points, but generally agrees that the original intent of the Schlieffen and Moltke "plans" was to attack and defeat the French Army wherever it was found. Unfortunately, Holmes often relies on the dubious works cited earlier of Foerster, Groener, and Ritter to refute Zuber.

19. Consequently, Martin Van Creveld's critique of Schlieffen's *Denkschrift* in *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (New York, 1977), pp. 113–22, is misplaced.

20. Robert Foley, "The Origins of the Schlieffen Plan," an unpublished paper presented on 26 May 2001 at the annual conference of the Society for Military History, argues that significant similarities nonetheless existed between the 1905 concept and earlier versions.

21. Zuber, "Schlieffen Plan," p. 282.

22. Zuber, "Schlieffen Plan," p. 305; and Holmes, "Reluctant March," pp. 228, 231. This is also the view of Annika Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War* (New York, 2001).

23. Zuber, "Schlieffen Plan," pp. 280, 283. Holmes, "Reluctant March," maintains, however, that this

preference would not preclude Schlieffen from planning an offensive operation.

24. For a recent work that still reflects this view, see John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York, 1999), pp. 28–36, which contains numerous flaws regarding the origin and intent of the Schlieffen Plan.

25. Zuber, "Schlieffen Plan," p. 305.

26. For a comparison of Schlieffen's concept of war to American, British, French, and Russian views, see Echevarria, *After Clausewitz*, Chapter 7.

Call for Papers: August 2002 Conference of Army Historians

The Center of Military History is soliciting papers for the 2002 biennial Conference of Army Historians, which will be held on 6–8 August 2002 in the Washington, D.C., area. The theme of the conference will be "The Cold War Army, 1947–1989." Papers may address any aspect of the U.S. Army's role during the Cold War but should be limited to twenty minutes in length. Prospective topics include the different military approaches of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the war in Vietnam, perspectives of Pacific nations on the U.S. Army, Army training and preparation for the war that never came, and the social and cultural issues the Army faced in this period.

Individuals interested in participating should send their proposed paper topics and some information about their background by mail to Dr. Robert S. Rush, U.S. Army Center of Military History, ATTN: DAMH-FPF, 103 Third Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5058, or by email to *rushrs@hqda.army.mil*. Further information may be obtained by calling Dr. Rush at 202-685-2727.

New U.S. Army Women's Museum Opens

Army officials dedicated the new U.S. Army Women's Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, in a ceremony held on 11 May 2001. Fort Lee had housed the Women's Army Corps Training Center from 1948 to 1954. Dr. Joseph Westphal, the acting secretary of the Army, spoke to a gathering of thousands of veterans and other guests at the dedication ceremony about the distinguished role of women in the Army's past, and he observed that in 2001 women comprise almost 15 percent of the Army's active force strength. Sergeant Major of the Army Jack L. Tilley told of the dedicated service of women in the Army today, giving examples of their work in Bosnia. Retired Col. Bettie Morden, long-time president of the Army Women's Museum Foundation, thanked all of those involved in the museum's planning and construction. Morden's last military assignment had been at the Center of Military History, where she wrote a history of the Women's Army Corps. Five of the six living directors of the Women's Army Corps, a former chief of the Army Nurse Corps, and the chief of military history also attended the ceremony, along with a bevy of other general and field grade officers.

After the ceremony the 13,325-square-foot museum welcomed its first public visitors. The service of women in the Army is portrayed in this museum by over 40 exhibits containing some 5,000 artifacts, including photographs, posters, and uniforms, as well as over 300 videos. The museum center also houses a library and a large collection of archival materials. The museum, which is located at 2100 Adams Avenue at Fort Lee, is open on Tuesdays through Fridays from 1000 to 1700 and on Saturdays and Sundays from 1100 to 1700. It is closed on Mondays and on three annual holidays: Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day. Researchers may make appointments to visit the library and archives by calling a staff member at 804-734-4327.

THE CHIEF'S CORNER

John Sloan Brown

It has been, as you will see below, yet another busy quarter. During this period the Army Staff and Secretariat were heavily engaged in the Quadrennial Review (QDR) and related Transformation initiatives at both the Army and the DOD levels. You can see that this influenced many of our activities. In addition, we did keep our long-term projects moving nicely. Some specifics:

The Histories Division has continued to provide quality historical support to the Army's QDR and Transformation processes. Information papers, briefings, and responses to inquiries continued to ensure that Army planners and decision makers at the highest levels incorporated historical data in their deliberations. The division researched and presented in a timely and effective fashion short histories of the offices of the Executive Communications Center (ECC) and Army's Director of Management (DM) and papers on British interwar defense policy, the limits of airpower, the degree of naval supremacy and superiority needed throughout history, the Army as a constabulary force, changes in the concept of tiered readiness, the value of ground forces to allies throughout history, and a host of other issues large and small. Now, more than ever, Army history is relevant and appreciated.

Histories Division also continued to pursue writing our histories of the Army, making major progress on several volumes of the history of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. A volume on the history of MACV, the joint command, and a second volume on the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency and low-intensity-conflict doctrine, this one covering 1941–75, were completed in draft and will soon be presented to their CMH review panels. The Oral History Activity conducted significant interviews with major participants in the Army's QDR and Transformation processes. This list included Lt. Gen. Paul Kern, Director of the Army Acquisition Corps; Lt. Gen. Joseph Cosumano, Commanding General of the Army Space and Missile Defense Command; Maj. Gen. William Lennox, then Chief of Legislative Liaison; and two senior officers then serving in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Maj. Gen. Michael Maples and Brig. Gen. Raymond Odierno.

During this quarter Production Services Division published new editions of *Spearhead of Logistics: A History of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps* by Benjamin King, Richard C. Biggs, and Eric R. Criner (a co-imprint with the U.S. Army Transportation Center, Fort Eustis); *American Military Heritage* by General William W. Hartzog (a co-imprint with the TRADOC Military History Office); *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76*, by Col. Robert A. Doughty (a co-imprint with the Combat Studies Institute); and an enhanced four-disc CD-ROM, *The United States Army in World War I*. It also published at the behest of the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans *Fletcher Conference 1999: Compendium* to provide Army libraries with durable copies of the papers given at this conference.

Production Services also delivered to the Army's Korean War Commemoration Committee large print runs of the Center's Phase 5 Korean War commemorative poster and its fourth and fifth Korean War commemorative pamphlets. These special editions carry the committee's logo and are intended for distribution far beyond the Army to private citizens and groups involved in commemorative programs.

Forthcoming Center titles include a large, new, co-imprint with the Office of the Judge Advocate General of *Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti* by Col. Fred Borch; a first edition of the new-style, paperback staff ride guide *Battle of Balls Bluff* by Ted Ballard; a Lewis and Clark expedition commemorative pamphlet; and the 2002 catalog, *Publications of the United States Army Center of Military History*.

Two historians from the Field Programs and Historical Services Division participated in a highly successful meeting in Bucharest, Romania, with the national military history institutes of eleven

European countries in the first Military History Working Group Conference. This effort was supported by a working relationship with the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes of the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. Representatives of the twelve member nations presented papers on the theme "Case Studies of the Cold War." CMH presenters were Richard Gorell, who spoke on "The US Army Preparation for the Invasion of Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis," and William Epley, who addressed the conference on "America's First Cold War Army." Another conference will be held next year in Sofia, Bulgaria. Dr. Gorell also represented the Center at the International Commission of Military History's XXVII Congress held in August in Athens, Greece. This Congress was organized by the Hellenic Commission of Military History.

The historians in the division's Force Structure and Unit History Branch have been actively involved in recent actions relating to unit awards. Since Congress passed legislation in 1996 authorizing the issuance of retroactive unit awards, the number of proposals submitted for approval has grown steadily. Several World War II units have recently been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (Army): the 96th Infantry Division for its service on Okinawa in 1945 and Combat Commands A and B of the 9th Armored Division for their contributions during the Battle of the Bulge. The division also provided instructors for military history detachment training in Atlanta, Georgia, supporting Forces Command and Army Reserve Command efforts.

Over the past quarter our Website Operations Activity has made great progress in posting the remaining volumes of the American Forces in Action series and in making these monographs available online. The recent additions to the CMH Website include: *Papuan Campaign: The Buna-Sanananda Operation; To Bizerte With the II Corps; Salerno: American Operations From the Beaches to the Volturno; Fifth Army at the Winter Line;* and *The Admiralties: Operations of the 1st Cavalry Division.* We hope to post the last four volumes of the series by October 2001. The series can be accessed at *www.army.mil/cmh-pg/collections/AFIA.htm.*

At this writing the Museum Division has completed final preparations for the 29th annual Army museum training course, to be held on 4–9 September, in Quebec City, Canada. The training course is a joint program with the Organization of Military Museums of Canada, Inc. This will be the Canadian organization's 35th annual museum course. The course will include museum site visits, interpretations and evaluations of exhibits, and discussions of collections management and conservation techniques. A review of the course will appear in the next *Army Museum Memo.* By using military air transport in lieu of commercial airlines for personnel attending the conference, the Center was able to save over $7,000 in travel costs.

I think you will agree that it has been a busy quarter for the Center of Military History and the Army Historical Program. Please let us know what you are doing. In particular, please share your thoughts about how we can serve you better. We are all members of the same team, and our focus is preserving the proud history and heritage of the American soldier.

Center Historians Honored for Service to Army Secretariat

Acting Secretary of the Army Gregory Dahlberg honored two Center historians for the series of professional development classes relating to the history of Army transformation efforts that they had prepared and presented to officers and civilians working for the Army Secretariat. Secretary Dahlberg gave Lawrence Kaplan the Superior Civilian Service Award in a ceremony at the Pentagon on 1 March. James Yarrison, who was unable to attend that ceremony, received the Commander's Award for Civilian Service from Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, the chief of military history, in a ceremony in the Center on 6 June. Both men received certificates signed by Secretary Dahlberg on 1 March. Assigned to the Center's Pentagon Research Team, Drs. Kaplan and Yarrison have both made dedicated efforts to share their historical perspectives with Army officers and civilian officials engaged in challenging assignments at the Pentagon.

The Military Provides Lincoln a Mandate

By Michael J. Forsyth

As the turmoil of the recent 2000 presidential election reached a crescendo, discussion among political pundits turned to absentee balloting and the military vote. Many commentators observed that for the first time votes from actively serving soldiers could have a significant impact on the outcome of the election, especially in Florida.[1] However, contrary to opinions in the press, the 2000 election was not the first instance in which soldier suffrage had an important impact on a presidential canvass. In 1864 soldiers and sailors throughout the Union armies and navies cast votes for President Abraham Lincoln, sealing the fate of the Confederacy. This election represented the first time in American history that active troops participated in a national election, but attaining that right for soldiers proved difficult.

As the year 1864 opened, prospects for Union victory appeared bright indeed. Federal armies in 1863 had scored a series of decisive victories in rapid succession. In July Federal forces defeated General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, captured Vicksburg, and reopened the Mississippi River; in November Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant drove the Confederates completely out of Tennessee in a smashing success at Chattanooga. The Confederacy found itself reeling on all fronts, and to the Northern public it appeared that 1864 would finally witness the end of this tragic war. Those hopes were soon dashed, however, when the offensives planned for the spring quickly bogged down in bloody stalemate.[2]

In March President Lincoln appointed Grant lieutenant general in the Regular Army, making him the General in Chief of all Union armies. Grant had been the most successful Union general, having strung together an impressive series of victories that included Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga. Lincoln had long searched for the man who "understood the math" and would put the rebellion to rest. Grant appeared to be the right leader to finish it in 1864.[3]

Grant arrived in Washington with a simple yet brilliant plan to crush the Confederacy. Grant believed that the South had survived militarily for three years because it could always use interior lines to move reinforcements to threatened points. This had staved off disaster on various occasions throughout the war. Grant concluded that the way to win the war was to apply unrelenting pressure on all of the South's major armies simultaneously. He reasoned that if the Confederates were unable to shift their forces, the sheer weight of Federal manpower would eventually cause the rebel armies to collapse.[4]

In accordance with Grant's program, Northern armies took the offensive on several fronts during the first week of May. In the west Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman with three armies advanced against General Joseph Johnston's Army of Tennessee. In the east Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley while Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler with his Army of the James moved to outflank Richmond from the south. Finally, the hard-luck Army of the Potomac commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade moved forward to attack Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Within thirty days of the start of the campaign every effort had suffered serious setbacks. The Army of the Potomac alone had suffered over 50,000 casualties and endured a series of tactical defeats in the Rapidan wilderness, at Spotsylvania, and at Cold Harbor.

News of the stalemate caused Northern optimism to plummet. With the armies stalled, it seemed to folks on the homefront that the South was as formidable a foe as ever. Further, peace-oriented Democrats began to use each reverse as evidence that Lincoln's war policy had failed. If the Lincoln administration could not win the war by November, it would have to stand for reelection in the midst of a civil war, a politically unpalatable scenario. The Republicans and Democrats both understood that failure on the battlefield could translate into a loss for Lincoln at the polls in November.[5]

Lincoln's Democratic opponent in the election was Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the popular former commander of the Army of the Potomac. Early in the war Lincoln and McClellan had locked horns on numerous occasions over how best to prosecute the war. Despite McClellan's acknowledged abilities in



THE

SOLDIER'S RIGHT TO VOTE.

WHO OPPOSES IT? WHO FAVORS IT?

THE RECORD OF THE

M'CLELLAN COPPERHEADS

Against allowing the Soldier who fights, the Right to Vote while fighting.

[PREPARED FOR THE UNION CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE,]

By William E. Chandler, of N. H.

WASHINGTON:
PRINTED BY LEMUEL TOWERS.
1864.

Title Page of an Election Pamphlet Denouncing Democratic Party Opposition to Voting by Union Soldiers in the Field

training an army, he demonstrated marked shortcomings in using troops in combat. McClellan's refusal to employ the army in accordance with Lincoln's wishes irritated the president deeply. The general's lack of aggressiveness following Antietam was the last straw for Lincoln. He relieved McClellan in November 1862, causing a near-mutiny in the army. McClellan's popularity and political alignment made him the darling of the Democratic Party. Democrats believed that he represented their best chance to wrest control of the White House from the Republicans. His charisma and his high stature with the American public made him a formidable opponent to his former commander in chief.[6]

Republican members of Congress began in the late spring of 1864 to express concern both about Lincoln's chances for reelection and about his steadfastness in the pursuit of Northern war aims. Many party leaders searched for alternative candidates and some even called for dumping Lincoln at the top of the ticket were he unwilling to yield voluntarily. Lincoln had few strong admirers within the Republican Party. The Radicals, abolitionists whose numbers included Senator Ben Wade of Ohio and Congressman Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, believed Lincoln too conciliatory to the South on the issues of slavery and reconstruction. They began to maneuver for a nominee who was more amenable to their views and likely to be more aggressive in implementing them as policy. However, the move to find a new candidate collapsed because the Radicals underestimated Lincoln's ability as a politician and the grass roots support Lincoln maintained in state GOP organizations. Nevertheless the Radicals' dissatisfaction with Lincoln remained evident during the campaign.[7]

The Radical Republicans, moreover, stymied Lincoln's hopes to gain electoral votes from Union-occupied areas of the South. When the 38th Congress had convened in December 1863, the president had proposed to recognize loyal Southern state governments elected by citizens in each state who would take an oath swearing loyalty to the Union and avowing support for all wartime acts of Congress and presidential proclamations regarding the future of slavery. Under Lincoln's plan reconstructed state governments could be recognized once 10 percent of their states' 1860 electorates had taken the oath of allegiance and elected new state officials under a new state constitution. Lincoln seems to have hoped that Tennessee, Louisiana, and Arkansas, at least, could be recognized in time for their electoral votes to be cast and counted in the 1864 elections.[8]

Confederate military successes and the opposition of both Democrats and Radical Republicans in Congress stood in the way of Lincoln's "10 percent plan." The Radicals feared that the members of Congress admitted from the restored states would join with Northern Democrats to form a new conservative majority on Capitol Hill. Democrats objected that those unwilling to give the president a blank check on determining the future of slavery would be disenfranchised. The two groups joined in objecting that the plan would create "rotten boroughs" under effective presidential control. In July 1864 Congress passed the Wade-Davis reconstruction bill requiring

loyalty oaths from 50 percent of citizens and congressional approval before states could be reintegrated. While Lincoln pocket vetoed the bill, he could hardly count on Congress in 1865 to count electoral votes from any states that had seceded, and in the event it did not.[9]

Many Republicans despaired of success as fall drew nearer. Lincoln himself believed there was little hope that he could win the election. His concern was so serious that he committed his thoughts to paper. On 23 August 1864 in the privacy of his office, Lincoln composed what is known as the "blind memorandum." It read:

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be reelected. Then it will be my duty to so cooperate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such grounds that he cannot possibly save it afterward.[10]

Lincoln sealed this memorandum in an envelope and called a cabinet meeting for the next day. At that meeting he presented it to the assemblage and obtained a promise from them that they would not open it until after the election. Lincoln's purpose, according to some historians, was to unify the cabinet behind redoubling the effort to win the war before the March 4 inauguration, should he lose the election. Lincoln believed this might be the only way to reunite the country successfully.[11]

In spite of the gloom, there existed one Republican initiative that provided Lincoln a ray of light in the election. It lay with the soldiers themselves. This set of citizens held a sincere affection and attachment for the president. For some time Republicans in states across the North had pushed to provide soldiers in the field with the opportunity to vote. Previous to the Civil War there had never been a conflict where so many soldiers had been absent from home at the time of a national canvass. In peacetime too, citizens in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not as mobile as they are today, and they rarely spent extended periods away from home. Therefore, state laws and constitutions contained no provision for absentee balloting. During the Civil War, as over a million citizens were away from their home districts serving their country at its time of crisis, politicians across the North sought to make provisions for soldier suffrage.[12]

Imbedded in United States military tradition is the notion that the Army is composed of citizen-soldiers. Republican politicians, who ardently supported the war effort, felt that these soldiers were carrying the fate of the nation on their bayonets and should have the right to raise their voices in the election.[13] Republicans also sensed that a large percentage of soldiers would support Lincoln's candidacy. The soldiers at the front frequently corresponded by mail with their families and kept diaries of their personal thoughts. Those letters and diaries demonstrated solid support for the administration, and state Republican organizations knew it. One Rhode Island soldier, who voted near Middletown, Virginia, observed: "Lincoln of course is the favorite with the soldiers," a view that was frequently repeated in the writings of common soldiers.[14]

Republicans had reason to believe that soldier opinions would also influence loved ones back home. Amidst all the partisan rhetoric over the conduct of the war, only the soldiers stood above the fray. As one author explained, "the soldiers were the unstained heroes in the eyes of their families and neighbors back home. . . . To vote or act inconsistently with what the boys in the field called for was to undermine them and the war effort." If the Republicans could tap into this source of votes they felt the administration would have a fighting chance to win. As a result, GOP organizations across the country rolled up their sleeves to provide soldiers the right to vote by absentee ballot.[15]

The effort to achieve soldier suffrage proved difficult. Since the state constitutions precluded voting outside one's home district, they required amending through a lengthy legislative and electoral process. Many Democrats objected to changing their constitutions to allow soldier voting in the field. The Democrats were as aware of soldier sentiments as the Republicans. They knew that a new source of Lincoln votes could undermine their own efforts to install McClellan in the White House.

New Jersey proved particularly resistant to a soldier-vote initiative. The Democrats dominated the statehouse and legislature of New Jersey. In spite of legal briefs presented to the legislature stating that the New Jersey constitution did not disallow absentee balloting, it rejected a measure to allow it. Also, as



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This pro-Lincoln cartoon by Thomas Nast appeared in the 2 November 1864 issue of Harpers' Weekly.

New Jersey was McClellan's home state, the Democrats wanted to assure his victory there. Illinois and Indiana were also unable to enact soldier suffrage provisions, but most Northern states did pass acts or amendments allowing soldiers to vote in the field.[16]

As late summer 1864 turned into early fall, Lincoln's fortunes began to brighten. In early August Rear Adm. David Farragut and his fleet steamed into Mobile Bay, closing off an important trade artery to the South. Then in the first week of September General Sherman finally captured Atlanta after a two-month-long siege. In September and October Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan won an impressive series of battles in the Shenandoah Valley culminating at Cedar Creek, effectively closing the Army of Northern Virginia's breadbasket forever. With each victory Lincoln's chances for reelection surged steadily upward. The soldiers' confidence in the administration soared, as did their belief in themselves and in ultimate victory.

This proved a key element in sealing Lincoln's reelection. Once the Confederacy appeared doomed, the soldiers were convinced that the only way to ensure complete destruction of the rebellion lay with the president. The troops, who had deeply admired McClellan as a commander, had second thoughts now about his fitness as a politician. They viewed him as the representative of a party whose peace platform would undercut all the hard work and sacrifice they and their fallen comrades had endured to date. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain spoke for many when he wrote after the war that the soldiers were "unwilling that their long fight be set down as a failure."[17] This was unacceptable to the men in the field, and their opinions soon became known not only in their letters and diaries, but also at the polls.

Having granted soldiers the right to vote, the states had to set up a mechanism by which they could exercise their privilege. Many states sent election officials south to the armies in the field, setting up polling stations with their states' regiments. All qualified soldiers were then allowed to cast their votes. Gideon Welles, Lincoln's dependable secretary of the Navy, even directed all naval commanders to provide the use of naval vessels as polling places for sailors aboard ship.[18]

Other states, including New York, set up cumbersome systems of voting. Each Empire State soldier first had to execute a proxy authorizing an elector in his city or town to cast his ballot for him, and he had to sign an affidavit attesting to his eligibility to vote. In the field, the soldier placed his ballot and proxy into a sealed envelope. Then he placed this envelope and his affidavit inside a second envelope stamped "Soldier's Vote" and sent the package home. On Election Day the designated proxy would deliver the sealed envelope to the polling station where election officials verified the validity of the affidavit. Upon finding the soldier's name on the list of registered voters or upon receiving a second affidavit from a "'householder of the district' that he knows the soldier to be a 'resident of the district,'" the election inspectors would place the ballot in the appropriate box.[19]

Unfortunately, this system became susceptible to accusations of fraud because the soldier's vote passed through another's hands. Accusations of serviceman vote fraud ran rampant in New York City, where Democratic operatives allegedly stuffed ballot boxes with fraudulent ballots.[20] Democrats leveled similar accusations against the administration for supposed strong-arm tactics at polling stations. In Baltimore and New York City, Union commanders deployed troops at voting places ostensibly to ensure order and prevent rioting by anti-administration elements. The election proved peaceful in both cities, but Democrats claimed that troop presence at the polls discouraged some potential voters while intimidating others. This fueled debate about the legitimacy of Lincoln's reelection similar to the discourse witnessed in the 2000 election.[21]

In the end, the troops played a significant role in reelecting Lincoln. Nationally, soldiers voted four to one in favor of Lincoln over McClellan, and in two states in particular the soldiers provided the majority. These were Connecticut and New York, pivotal states that Lincoln needed for a decisive victory. In Connecticut, the Lincoln majority proved razor-thin, with his tally totaling 44,693 votes to McClellan's 42,288. The soldiers cast some 2,898 votes for the president, providing the margin of victory and swinging the state's five electoral votes to him. Of greater importance, the men in uniform handed Lincoln a win in New York with its thirty-three electoral votes. Lincoln polled 368,726 votes to McClellan's 361,986 in the Empire State. With more than 70,000 votes cast by the soldiers at a likely four-to-one Lincoln margin, the men in the field easily made the difference for the president. The soldiers had spoken for the first time in a national

plebiscite and their message was loud and clear: stay the course and win the war. As one veteran eloquently stated, "that grand old army performed many heroic acts, but never in its history did it do a more devoted service than vote for Abraham Lincoln."[22]

As critical as the presidential election was, the congressional contests were arguably more important still. Even if the Republicans could retain the executive branch, they had to have control of the legislature to ensure that Congress would enact laws promoting Union war aims. The fighting men did not let Lincoln down on this account. In the Ohio House races the Republicans captured an astonishing total of twelve previously Democratic seats. The Republicans also picked up six House seats each in Illinois and New York and four each in Indiana and Pennsylvania. Overall the Grand Old Party emerged with more than two-thirds of the seats in both the House and the Senate.[23] In several congressional districts, particularly in Ohio, the soldiers cast the decisive votes. After Lincoln's assassination, the Republicans in Congress took the lead in guaranteeing civil rights to the newly freed slaves and in preventing a quick return to power by Confederate leaders in the southern states.

The 1864 election contest proved a landmark event in world history as a democratic nation for the first time carried out a presidential election in the midst of a civil war. Even more remarkable was the fact that soldiers in the field exercised their right to participate in the process by casting votes. These men helped determine the future direction of the country by voting overwhelmingly for Lincoln. These Union soldiers paved the way for succeeding generations of soldiers to exercise their privilege in free and fair elections. All troops serving the nation today owe a debt of gratitude to these men who cast the first absentee soldier ballots in the history of our country.

Maj. Michael J. Forsyth is a field artillery officer attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served as an artillery platoon leader in Operation DESERT STORM, *a battalion fire support officer in the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, a battery commander in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and an observer controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He holds a master's degree in military history from Louisiana State University. His first book,* The Red River Campaign of 1864, *is due for release from McFarland & Company before the end of 2001.*

NOTES

1. See for example Vince Crawley, "Turning the Tide: Absentee Voters from Military May Decide Presidency," *Army Times*, 20 Nov 2000, pp. 22–24.
2. David E. Long, *The Jewel of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln's Re-Election and the End of Slavery* (Mechanicsburg, Pa., 1994), p. 91.
3. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, 3 vols. (New York, 1958–74), 3: 4–6; Bruce Catton, *A Stillness at Appomattox* (Garden City, N.Y., 1953), pp. 41–43.
4. Catton, *Stillness at Appomattox*, pp. 66–67; Foote, *The Civil War*, 3: 13–17.
5. Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, pp. 179–94.
6. Ibid., pp. 11, 51.
7. John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, 10 vols. (New York, 1890), 9: 29–51; T. Harry Williams, *Lincoln and the Radicals* (Madison, Wisc., 1941), pp. 306–31.
8. William B. Hesseltine, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction* (reprint ed., Gloucester, Mass., 1963), pp. 94–108; Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: A History*, 8: 106–09, 418; Foote, *The Civil War*, 3: 27; Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, p. 31–32.
9. Hesseltine, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction*, pp. 98–119, 126–35.
10. John G. Nicolay and John Hay, eds. *Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works, Comprising His Speeches, Letters, State Papers, and Miscellaneous Writings*, 2 vols. (New York, 1894), 2: 568.
11. Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, p. 189.
12. Ibid., p. 217.
13. Ibid., pp. 215–16.
14. Robert H. Rhodes, ed., *All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion as Told by the Diary and Letters of Elisha Hunt Rhodes, Who Enlisted as a Private in '61 and Rose to the Command of His Regiment* (Lincoln, R.I., 1985), p. 196. For a wide-ranging study of Civil War soldiers' political attitudes, see Joseph Allan Frank, *With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers* (Athens, Ga., 1998).
15. Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, p. 216; William F. Zornow,

Lincoln and the Party Divided (Norman, Okla., 1954), pp. 200–201.

16. Ibid., pp. 217–19; Frank, *With Ballot and Bayonet*, p. 95.

17. Joshua L. Chamberlain, *The Passing of the Armies: An Account of the Final Campaign of the Army of the Potomac, Based upon Personal Reminiscences of the Fifth Army Corps* (reprint ed., Gettysburg, 1994), p. 12.

18. Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, p. 219; Gideon Welles, *The Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson*, 3 vols. (Boston, 1911), 2: 175.

19. *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events*, 4 (1864): 581–82; Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, pp. 219–20.

20. Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, p. 219.

21. Zornow, *Lincoln and the Party Divided*, pp. 202–04; Hesseltine, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction*, pp. 130–32.

22. Zornow, *Lincoln and the Party Divided*, pp. 201–02; Long, *Jewel of Liberty*, pp. 257, 285; and Ken Burns, *The Civil War*, videotape, Vol. 7.

23. Kenneth C. Martis, *The Historical Atlas of Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789–1989* (New York, 1989), pp. 116–19.

Letter to the Editor

To the Editor:

We have received the Winter 2001 edition of *Army History* [No. 51].

I found the article "The Pentomic Puzzle" very interesting but would offer one minor correction. Lt. Col. [Kalev] Sepp is correct in saying that the "U.S. Army was alone among the great armies of the world to configure itself in this . . . fashion," but when he continues to say that "no other nation . . . chose to emulate" he is incorrect.

The Australian Army followed the U.S. example with a formation tailored (it was claimed) for jungle warfare and called "Pentropic." It didn't work for us either and is usually referred to as a disaster. (It was not fully implemented as the battalion sent to Malaya as part of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve remained on the old, essentially British, establishment.) As you can imagine, doing this on a two-year rotation in an army that then had only three regular infantry battalions gave a new dimension to the word disruptive.

The real embarrassment was that, due to the usual lag time to staff and implement an idea, we went Pentomic just as the U.S. Army gave up and went ROAD. The organisation we abandoned was almost identical to ROAD. The pressures of *Konfrontasi* [the confrontation with Indonesia over Malayasia in 1964–65] and the looming commitment to Vietnam forced a return to more traditional organisations. The Tropical Warfare (TW) division was almost identical to the old pre-pentropic organisation except that (probably as a face-saving measure) the brigades were redesignated task forces. This organisation remained almost unchanged during our Vietnam commitment, so it obviously worked.

The Australian pentropic experience is recorded in J. C. Blaxland, *Organising an Army: The Australian Experience, 1957–1965*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 50 (Canberra, 1989).

Bill Houston
Army History Unit
Australian Defence Forces

Call for Papers: 2002 Conference of the Council on America's Military Past

The Council on America's Military Past (CAMP) will hold its 36th annual military history conference on 10–14 July 2002 at the Wyndham Old San Juan Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The conference will emphasize United States military activities in the Caribbean region and will include visits to historic military sites in Puerto Rico. Paper proposals should be sent to CAMP '02 Conference Papers, P.O. Box 1151, Fort Myer, Virginia 22211-1151. Further information is available from retired Col. Herbert M. Hart, who may be reached by phone at 703-912-6124 or by email at *camphart1@aol.com*.

Book Review
by Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army
Edited by Jerold E. Brown
Greenwood Press, 2001, 659 pp., $99.50

In undertaking a project such as the *Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army*, the editor inevitably faces certain dangers. First and foremost, the reader has every right to assume that a volume such as the Dictionary of This, or the Encyclopedia of That, will be as comprehensive as these titles suggest. Very often, however, this genre disappoints, as the search for entry after entry reveals gaps in the coverage. Second, compiling entries from numerous contributors can lead to uneven narrative, with the weaker submissions glaring from the pages. Prof. Jerold E. Brown of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, has faced these dangers successfully, and the result is a fine reference work.

The book begins with a very brief but thoughtful historical sketch of the U.S. Army, followed by 530 pages of individual entries. Each entry concludes with the writer's name and citations to one or more references. The editor has included a helpful feature: within the introductory history and each subsequent essay, an asterisk highlights any term that has its own entry in the dictionary.

The editor's purpose is to present in one volume a "broad cross section of military terms, concepts, arms and equipment, units and organizations, campaigns and battles, and individuals who have contributed significantly to the U.S. Army." (p. ix) Drawing upon his many years of teaching military history, along with suggestions from his colleagues at CSI and other scholars, Professor Brown then struggled over which entries to exclude because of space limitations. Forced to "omit a number of excellent submissions," (p. ix) the editor reminds the reader that the literature already contains numerous sources dealing with the terms, names, and concepts peculiar to the U.S. Army.

The resulting dictionary is remarkably comprehensive, as the inclusion of such entries as Beetle Bailey, Sergeant Bilko, the Green Books, and Laundress suggests. The addition of these topics adds dimension and interest for the general reader. On the other hand, although the student of military history knows that the term D-day is generic, the general reader likely equates D-day to 6 June 1944 at Normandy. OVERLORD is treated, quite properly, but the general reader will search the *Dictionary* unsuccessfully for D-day or for Normandy. For that matter, the same user will not find the Battle of the Bulge, another less than accurate but certainly popular usage. Curiously, there are separate entries for the Office of the Chief of Military History and the Center of Military History, when a cross-reference from the former to the successor agency might have sufficed. Vietnamization, on the other hand, has no separate heading, but the subject is adequately defined in the entry Vietnam War. Military Government is another term that did not earn its own entry. It is treated under Civil Affairs, although the two are not entirely the same. Moreover, while examining military government efforts in postwar Germany and Japan, this article does not mention our extended civil affairs efforts on Okinawa, lasting until 1972. Those readers inclined to cavil can no doubt think of other subjects not treated under their own headings, but there are no serious sins of omission. Incidentally, civilians who are still puzzled by Al Pacino's frequent outbursts of "hoo-ah" in the movie *Scent of a Woman* can now refer to the entry Hough on page 235.

Professor Brown has drawn on no fewer than 103 other contributors, many current and former colleagues at CSI. Although the writers range from retired lieutenant generals to graduate students, the resultant narrative is never noticeably uneven. Rather than memorably stylish, the prose is serviceable and clear, just as it should be.

Appendix A consists of eight pages of abbreviations and acronyms. The editor notes that the Army's use of these is "ubiquitous." He refers the reader to more comprehensive sources, while explaining that acronyms often have more than one meaning and that these can change over time. Still, this is the one section of the book that might well have been expanded. Among the missing and presumed lost: S–1, G–2, DIVAD, and MLRS.

Appendix B lists the ranks and grades in the U.S.

Army. An excellent, thorough list of sources, sixty-five pages long, and a detailed index follow. These two extensive sections are very good, and students of the Army's history will find them helpful.

Among all of the sources listed in the *Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army,* nowhere is the U.S. Army Center of Military History's quarterly, *Army History*, mentioned. Some may argue that this omission is a peculiar concern on the part of the reviewer, but *Army History* has earned its place in elucidating the evolution of U.S. Army history. Overlooking the Center's historical professional bulletin necessarily leads to a gap in coverage, at least in certain narrow areas. Thus, the *Dictionary*'s entry for Center of Military History cites Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson's article, "CMH," in the October 1990 *Army* but does not include Terrence Gough's more detailed piece, "The U.S. Army Center of Military History: A Brief History," which appeared in the Spring 1996 issue of *Army History*.

This last observation should in no way detract from the fact that the *Historical Dictionary of the U.S. Army* is an admirable professional effort. It is well conceived and executed, and there is simply nothing else quite like it that is current in the literature. Students of U.S. Army history should keep it in mind as a valuable resource, although, at $99.50 a copy, some will want to refer to it at their libraries.

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Book Review
by Vincent J. Cirillo

Surgeons at War: Medical Arrangements for the Treatment of the Sick and Wounded in the British Army during the Late 18th and 19th Centuries
by Matthew H. Kaufman
Greenwood Press, 2001, 227 pp., $65.00

In *Surgeons at War*, Matthew H. Kaufman argues that the incompetence and mismanagement of the British War Office and the British Army thwarted the Army Medical Department's efforts to provide optimal care for British soldiers. The best medical skills could not prevail in the bureaucratic morass of red tape and inefficiency. In addition, the lessons of Britain's wars with France (1793–1815) were forgotten in the intervening decades of peace, government cost-cutting, and downsizing of the medical corps. Thus Britain entered the Crimean War (1854–56) just as unprepared as it had been when it fought the Napoleonic Wars.

Kaufman's thesis is supported by the evidence he presents on the training of medical officers, the evacuation of wounded from the battlefield, the distribution of military supplies, and the contemptuous attitudes of line officers toward their medical colleagues. Although other European powers had established schools of military medicine in the eighteenth century, with France having done so in 1747, Britain's Army Medical School was not founded until 1860. Consequently, new medical officers were ignorant of the problems they would encounter in war. None of the army surgeons sent to the Crimea had previous experience with handling trauma cases. This was a critical deficiency because "war is an epidemic of trauma," as Russian surgeon Nicholas Pirogov (1810–81) observed.

In 1792 Dominique-Jean Larrey, surgeon-in-chief to Napoleon's *Grand Armée*, invented the celebrated "flying ambulances," which revolutionized the evacuation of wounded. Despite the obvious advantages of Larrey's system, the British developed no comparable procedures for recovering their casualties. Using bullock-drawn wagons, the British took more than four days to remove all wounded from the battlefield at Waterloo in 1815. To make matters worse, the teamsters were untrained and often irresponsible men. Line officers refused to release good men for noncombatant duty.

During the Crimean War Andrew Smith, Director-General of the British Army Medical Department, repeatedly pleaded with the War Office for an ambulance corps modeled after Larrey's, but the government dragged its feet. The ambulances that were finally built were too few and came too late. The War Office, without consulting the medical officers in the field, replaced the lightweight wheels of Larrey's design

with heavy artillery wheels, which made these vehicles useless in the muddy terrain of the Crimea.

The Supplies Commission, charged in 1855 with investigating the supply deficiencies in the Crimea, accused the Commissariat Department of gross mismanagement. Medical stores were lost in transit or delivered to the wrong location. During the severe winter of 1854–55, more than 16,000 overcoats lay in storage while soldiers only a few miles away were dying from the cold. Similar unconscionable acts prevented the timely delivery of food, cooking utensils, clothing, waterproof gear, tents, and bedding. Without soap or a change of underwear, men were soon crawling with lice. Typhus peaked in the winter months when lice-infested men were herded together because of a tent shortage.

Medical officers' recommendations to improve personal hygiene and camp sanitation were almost invariably disregarded by the line officers in command. A medical request to remove rotting corpses and animal carcasses—a source of disease—from Balaklava was rejected. There was a long history of tension between medical officers and line officers in the British Army. Kaufman points out that after the Battle of Talavera during the Peninsular War in 1809, line officers did not consult the medical staff before choosing a campsite in a marshy area. As a result, a third of their men became incapacitated by malaria. Friction between line and medical officers was not unique to the British Army. The disregard of the recommendations of medical officers, and the prevalence of disease that resulted, had their parallels in the United States Army as late as the Spanish-American War (1898).

The title *Surgeons at War* is misleading, for we learn little about how surgeons at war plied their craft. The treatment of disease, gunshot wounds, and fractures and problems with camp sanitation—instrumental in the spread of cholera, dysentery, and fevers that nearly decimated the army—are barely mentioned. Kaufman states, without providing documentation, that the British Army first used quinine as a prophylactic against intermittent fever in the Crimea (p. 130). This claim should have been developed, for it challenges the long-standing belief that the principle of chemoprophylaxis in military preventive medicine was devised by Union Army surgeons during the American Civil War (Stanhope Bayne-Jones, *The Evolution of Preventive Medicine in the United States Army, 1607–1939* [Washington, D.C., 1968], p. 101).

Although *Surgeons at War* contains a good deal of valuable information, it is marred by a distressing number of errors, omissions, and inconsistencies. Kaufman writes, for example, that British regiments were armed with the Minié rifle in the Crimean War (p. 131). Her Majesty's forces were, in fact, equipped with the .58-caliber Enfield, Pattern 1853, a muzzle-loading, rifled musket with a percussion cap ignition system. (During the American Civil War, both sides purchased thousands of these Enfields.) The term "Minié rifle" refers to any rifled musket, such as the Enfield, firing the cylindro-conoidal bullet invented by French Army Capt. Claude-Étienne Minié in 1849. The bullet, called the Minié ball, was used for the first time in the history of warfare during the Crimean War. Its superior range, accuracy, and penetration made spherical lead bullets and smoothbore muskets obsolete. Since Britain's French, Turkish, and Sardinian allies and some of their Russian enemies also used the Minié ball, it is astonishing that there is no discussion of the new projectile. The extensive bone comminution and soft tissue destruction produced by the Minié ball presented new challenges for military surgeons, as documented in George H. B. Macleod's *Notes on the Surgery of the War in the Crimea, with Remarks on the Treatment of Gunshot Wounds* (Philadelphia, 1862), which is not cited by Kaufman.

Better editing could have eliminated many annoying inconsistencies. Kaufman first states that James McGrigor was appointed to the newly created position of director-general of the Army Medical Department in 1815 (p. 25), but later we learn that in 1819 he succeeded Director-General John Weir, who had served in that capacity for nine years (p. 34). Also, Kaufman first states that each French ambulance unit was staffed by 340 men (p. 85), but this subsequently becomes 113 men (p. 90). Presumably, the author meant "division" in the latter case, since each unit comprised three divisions. Last, the casualty tables for the Crimean War (pp. 171–74) are confusing. Total deaths for the British, for example, range from 18,058 (Table 4.2) to 29,647 (Table 4.1) and those for the French from 32,000 (Table 4.1) to 93,250 (Table 4.4). The author provides no explanation of these

differences.

Historians will find *Surgeons at War* useful, but they must be prepared to recognize its shortcomings.

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Book Review
by Parker Hills

Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign
Edited by Leonard Fullenkamp, Stephen Bowman, and Jay Luvaas
University Press of Kansas, 1998, 482 pp.
cloth $39.95, paper $17.95

Mississippi's misfortune as the locale of much of the fighting in the Western Theater of the Civil War has become a boon to the modern military. The nearly pristine condition of most of the state's battlefields provides time capsules for the serious student of the military art, along with points of interest for tourists and Civil War enthusiasts.

The study of tactics, the art by which the commanders of corps and smaller units win battles and engagements, is exemplified in northern Mississippi at Brice's Crossroads. But for the study of strategy and the operational art, the Vicksburg campaign is the masterpiece. At the operational level, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant brilliantly conducted a campaign to attain the strategic goal of control of the Mississippi River. This campaign included 5 battles fought in a 17-day period, 2 major assaults on well-prepared fortifications, and a 47-day siege. The campaign was also a model of effective joint operations, as Grant masterfully utilized the U.S. Navy in achieving his mission.

Guide to the Vicksburg Campaign recognizes, in its introduction, the significance of the Vicksburg campaign as a study in joint operations and the operational art. While this book is a guide to limited points on various battlefields, it unfortunately does not properly explore Grant's employment of the operational art. The back roads, routes by which Grant maneuvered his three corps, are not explored. The reader is provided selected after-action reports of commanders, gleaned from the *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. These reports are often excellent firsthand accounts of the action, but they neither provide an analysis nor capture the true essence of the campaign, which the 1986 edition of Field Manual 100–5, *Operations*, called "the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil."[1]

The book is divided into three parts, plus an introduction. Part I includes fifteen chapters of reports from commanders and other staff officers, and it is an excellent synopsis of accounts of events of the campaign. The editors' selection rescues the reader from the arduous task of reading the *Official Records* at length. Thus the book provides a study of the principal events that led to the Union capture of Vicksburg and Lt. Gen. John Pemberton's Confederate army. Part II is a tour of many of the battlefields of the campaign, and it includes such peripheral sites as Grant's Canal and Fort Pemberton. Part III is a tour of the Vicksburg Military Park proper, as well as an optional visit to South Fort.

While Part I is a conveniently abridged version of the *Official Records*, it lacks the analysis needed to truly convey the brilliance of the campaign. Grant's own reports are often written with the convenience of hindsight. In an effort to portray himself as a commander who saw through the "fog of war," Grant obscures the fact that he displayed remarkable flexibility in changing situations. Time and again, at Hard Times, Grand Gulf, Hankinson's ferry, Dillon's farm, Jackson, and numerous other sites, Grant had to make extremely difficult decisions based upon military intelligence, his training, and his experience. An analysis of these decisions, coupled with an understanding of the situations which dictated them and the maneuvers which resulted from them, is key to understanding Grant's mastery of the operational art. However the supporting map, "Grant's Line of Operations, 31 March to 19 May, 1863," (p. 196) is far too simplified, depicting Grant's army moving in unison along one route. It leads the reader to believe that Jackson, not the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, was Grant's objective prior to turning west to Vicksburg, and it ignores the well-coordinated movement of the three corps of Grant's army along numerous axes of advance toward that

railroad. Moreover, the map depicts Dillon [*sic*] on the Utica-Raymond road, instead of showing Dillon's farm along the Port Gibson–Cayuga–Raymond road.

Tourists will likely derive more satisfaction from Part II, a driving tour of campaign sites outside of Vicksburg, than will the serious student, for the stops are far too limited in scope. The directions to Grant's Canal are now obsolete due to a bridge closing, but this will always be the case in a guided tour book. Despite the limited coverage of the tactical action on the battlefield, this section's greatest weakness is the lack of detail regarding the maneuvers of Grant's army. Many of the routes traveled by Grant and his subordinates, Maj. Gens. John A. McClernand, James B. McPherson, and William T. Sherman, can be seen immediately adjacent to the modern paved road. Some of these old roadbeds can be walked, so that the flavor of the campaign may be absorbed. Grindstone Ford, Willow Springs, the old Port Gibson–Raymond road, Dillon's farm, and the old Bridgeport road offer many wonderful experiences where one can "feel the ghosts" of soldiers marching by and, more importantly, appreciate Grant's scheme of maneuver.

Part III, a driving tour of Vicksburg National Military Park, is satisfying in that it places the park sites in proper order. However, the terrain is not explored and a terrain analysis is not provided. Grant's avenues of approach, particularly those used on 19 and 22 May during the futile Union attacks on the Confederate fortifications, can yield many lessons when walked and analyzed. There are also some minor errors, such as the statement that "Confederate artillery here [at South Fort] commanded the river from its dominating position." (p. 459) In fact, in 1863 the Mississippi River ran almost a half-mile in front of South Fort, which severely limited its river defense mission. However, the fort dominated a key avenue of approach, the Warrenton road.

The book has some rare photographs from the U.S. Army Military History Institute that, by themselves, will draw even experienced Vicksburg campaign enthusiasts back to the military park to make "then and now" comparisons. The book is well worth reading if for nothing more than the photographs and the abridged *Official Records* accounts. It will provide some insight to those unfamiliar with the campaign, and it offers routes for a limited tour and analysis.

Even though this book is one of the U.S. Army War College Guides to the Civil War Battles, it is not, and does not declare itself to be, a guide for a serious military study of a great campaign.

NOTES

1. Department of the Army Field Manual 100–5, *Operations*, 5 May 1986, p. 91.

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Book Review
by Roger Cunningham

Long Gray Lines
The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839–1915
by Rod Andrew, Jr.
University of North Carolina Press, 2001
169 pp., $29.95

Long Gray Lines surveys the first seventy-five years of the military colleges that served the South, beginning with the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1839. The author, an officer in the Marine Corps Reserve and a former faculty member at the Citadel, has an excellent background for this well-written study, which began as his dissertation.

Military colleges first appeared in the North but quickly spread to the South. Between 1845 and 1860 there was at least one state-supported military school in every slave state except Texas, with many other private military academies receiving some kind of public assistance. By the end of the 1850s, any discussion of state support for these academies usually included "reminders that such schools would be a prudent

safeguard in case of future conflict with the . . . North," (p. 22) but this was only one of several justifications offered for military education in the South. Basically, Southerners tended to emphasize soldierly virtues—self-discipline, physical vigor, and courage—as essential elements of a worthy citizen.

The Civil War severely tested the military schools, and some of them were literally destroyed. After the war, Southerners did not forget the many contributions of their graduates to the Confederacy. Memories of Citadel cadets firing on the *Star of the West* (1861) and the charge of the VMI cadets at the battle of New Market (1864) were especially poignant. The great fame of West Point graduates such as Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. Jackson, and J. E. B. Stuart also underscored the importance of military education in Southerners' minds. As the older schools struggled to emerge from the ashes of war, the federal government ironically contributed to the rebirth of the Southern military school tradition by funding colleges through the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. This law granted federal land to each state and authorized the land's sale and the use of the proceeds to fund at least one college providing instruction in scientific agriculture and the practical sciences, including military tactics. While most Northern land-grant colleges simply offered some military instruction in their curricula, in the South land-grant schools typically required all of their male students to wear uniforms, drill, and submit to a military lifestyle, and they exhorted their students "to imitate the virtues of their Confederate forebears." (p. 45) Thus the Lost Cause and the image of the honorable citizen-soldier helped to justify the resurgence of Southern military schools.

The enduring glorification of the Lost Cause also contributed to much student defiance and rebelliousness in the South's military schools. Believing that their ancestors had nobly resisted oppression, Southern students thought that if they were being treated unfairly, the honorable thing to do was to revolt. In 1898 almost two-thirds of the Citadel's cadet corps was expelled for forcibly attempting to remove a fellow cadet from barracks. Twenty-four of the expelled cadets were only weeks from graduation. Four years later, sixty-nine of Clemson's seventy-four sophomores withdrew to protest the suspension of a classmate for stealing. Clemson trustees resolved this affair by overturning the suspension. Thus, the Southern military tradition incorporated the idea that "for the health of society and the honor of its citizens, the latter must sometimes resist authority as well." (p. 77)

One of the book's most interesting chapters discusses the development of military education at black colleges, notably Hampton Institute, Georgia State Industrial College (now Savannah State), South Carolina State, and Florida A&M. The last three of these institutions owed their existence to the second Morrill Act, passed in 1890, which required states either to admit African American students to existing land-grant colleges or to establish separate institutions for them. Southern states chose the latter option, and at a few of the resulting schools military programs developed before the turn of the century. Others, such as Prairie View A&M in Texas, established military programs after World War I.

The military tradition in these black schools evolved differently than it did in the white institutions. It often came slowly—Florida A&M waited twelve years after its reorganization as a land-grant institution to insist on uniforms or military drill, and it waited another six years to appoint a commandant of cadets. Most of the black schools also neglected the study of military tactics, although this was not the case at South Carolina State thanks to the presence of two early faculty members who were among the few African Americans to have attended West Point. Perhaps the most significant difference, however, was the fact that black cadets were generally unarmed. They drilled with sticks or short lances but rarely held a rifle, which was certainly detrimental to their esprit. All in all, the author concludes that "the society that granted only nominal citizen status to blacks was also hesitant to . . . train them as soldiers (p. 104)."

If *Long Gray Lines* has a weakness, it is that the author says little about the service in the post–Civil War U.S. military that a number of the graduates of these colleges performed. He does acknowledge that many of them volunteered to serve during the Spanish-American War, but there are few specifics. This suggests that in the period under consideration the educational institutions examined had a minor impact on the military forces of the United States. The distinguished military career of George C. Marshall, a 1901 VMI graduate, however, shows that at their best

these schools could contribute substantially to the nation's service.

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Book Review
by Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

The Making of a Professional
Manton S. Eddy, USA
by Henry Gerard Phillips
Greenwood Press, 2000, 246 pp., $65

The leadership, professionalism, bravery, and battlefield successes of Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy during World War II have been significantly underappreciated, according to author and retired Army Lt. Col. Henry Gerard Phillips. As commanding general of the 9th Infantry Division and later the XII Corps, Eddy played an important but relatively unheralded role in the Allied victories in North Africa and Europe. The purpose of this interesting book is to help rescue Eddy from the relative obscurity to which he has seemingly been relegated.

Born in 1892, Eddy was expelled from a Chicago public high school for fraternity antics and sent to a military school from which he graduated in 1913. He then tried civilian life, but was neither very successful nor happy at it. With American participation in World War I looming on the horizon, he joined the U.S. Army in 1916. By virtue of his military high school experience and "honor graduate" designation, Eddy obtained a commission as an infantry lieutenant. He deployed to France in May 1918 as a captain in the 4th Infantry Division and saw combat as a machine gun company commander until wounded in action three months later. After recuperating, Eddy served as a battalion commander for a short period before the Armistice.

Eddy's interwar assignments were typical of those of a junior officer: student, staff, and instructor duty at the Infantry School; ROTC duty; a two-year posting in Hawaii; and assignment as a student and instructor at the Army Command and General Staff School. He attended the Infantry Advanced Course in 1929 when Lt. Col. (later General) George C. Marshall was assistant commandant, and Eddy's innovative monograph on his combat experience apparently drew the future Army chief of staff's attention. Nonetheless, Eddy, like so may of his peers, was probably saved from retirement as a colonel or lieutenant colonel only by the coming of World War II.

The Army's size and force structure increased exponentially beginning in 1940, providing numerous opportunities for higher command positions and promotions for proven Regular Army officers like Eddy. By mid-1942 he had been promoted to major general and named commander of the 9th Infantry Division. Because elements of the 9th Infantry Division were attached to various task forces during the November 1942 invasion of North Africa, Eddy remained in Washington, D.C., to command the Provisional Corps of the Western Task Force. Six weeks later Eddy rejoined his division, and he was preparing to move it to the front when General Erwin Rommel attacked through Kasserine Pass in February 1943. Eddy and his men helped stabilize the precarious situation there. He then led his unit in battles at El Guettar, Sedjenane, and elsewhere in Tunisia, contributing to the defeat and surrender of the German and Italian forces that remained in North Africa. The 9th Infantry Division also fought in the conquest of Sicily, but in November 1943 it redeployed to England to train for the invasion of continental Europe.

The 9th Infantry Division apparently worked hard during the six months before D-Day, although this book provides little substantive information on the training it conducted or Eddy's role in it. The 9th Infantry Division's mission at Normandy was to land on D+4, 10 June 1944, and serve as VII Corps reserve, prepared to reinforce the assaulting 4th or 90th Infantry Divisions. Eddy himself landed at UTAH Beach on D+2, and shortly thereafter his organization took over the faltering 90th Division's mission. Eddy was then directed to sever the Cherbourg Peninsula. This was

arguably Eddy's finest hour, as he aggressively led his soldiers, employed massive firepower, and maneuvered his elements through the difficult hedgerow country to the Cherbourg fortress, which his division helped capture. For his leadership and bravery there, Eddy was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Eddy commanded his division during Operation COBRA, the breakout from Normandy at the end of July 1944, and was selected to command XII Corps the following month. This corps frequently served as the spearhead of Lt. Gen. George Patton's Third Army, saw action in the Ardennes, and crossed the Rhine into the German heartland. However, with victory in sight, Eddy became ill with life-threatening high blood pressure, and Patton relieved him in mid-April. His absence from the final pantheon of victorious generals is probably one reason why Eddy has been somewhat overlooked by history. Eddy's military career was not over, however, and he was again fit for duty in early 1946. He received his third star in 1948, served as commander in chief of U.S. Army, Europe, and retired in 1953. Eddy died in 1962.

Eddy started keeping a diary in late May 1944, shortly before D-Day. Phillips has made good use of this diary, and although entries for 12 June–6 July 1944 are missing, it sheds considerable light on Eddy's perceptions and performance as a division and corps commander in Europe. Five of Eddy's wartime aides-de-camp also provided information to the author, as did others; while of some interest and merit, the credibility and accuracy of half-century-old reminiscences need to be assessed carefully. Twelve low-quality photographs and eight maps provide a visual complement to the text of this biography.

Unfortunately, the author, who earlier personally published three books he had written on 9th Infantry Division battles, includes in this study extensive, quoted dialogue. As Phillips admits, many of these conversations "are inventions, made up to clarify or, merely to shed light on the subject's personality," (p. xvii) since the author believes "the historian's obligation . . . is to make his dish as tasty as possible while preserving the integrity and true sense of what is being described." (p. xvii) On the contrary, fictitious dialogue taints the integrity and veracity of a historical work. In addition, a significant amount of extraneous, and often irrelevant, material, which should either have been included in endnotes or deleted, litters the text. The narrative, moreover, is frequently disjointed, and events and activities are sometimes described out of chronological order. The author's numerous uncorroborated presumptions and concoctions and his irregular handling of documentation diminish the viability of this study.

Prompted by his long combat service in the 9th Division during World War II and his personal admiration for Eddy, Phillips has written a narrative study of a man of character and a successful combat commander. *The Making of a Professional* is Eddy's first biography, and as such it should serve to bring the general's career and accomplishments to the attention of a larger, contemporary audience. Unfortunately, one will still have to wait for a definitive study of General Eddy's life and leadership.

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Book Review
by Aldo E. Salerno

Through the Valley: Vietnam, 1967–1968
by James F. Humphries
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999, 335 pp., $49.95

Through the Valley is a superbly written and researched story of combat in Vietnam. Author James F. Humphries, a retired Army colonel, recounts his experience as a rifle company commander with the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Infantry Brigade (Light), focusing on several unsung battles in the northern provinces of South Vietnam in 1967 and 1968. Relying on eyewitness accounts and official records, Humphries has fashioned a vivid saga of courageous American soldiers battling a formidable enemy in a surreal landscape of rice paddies, tapioca fields, and dense jungles. Students of the Vietnam War wishing to understand the true nature of ground combat in that

conflict would do well to consult this book.

Admittedly Humphries chronicles a demoralizing brand of fighting. He and his band of soldiers ventured from their fire support bases to search for an elusive antagonist who played a skillful but deadly game of cat and mouse. The determined North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong guerrillas relentlessly kept the Americans on the defensive. U.S. troops conducted frequent search and destroy missions, and occasionally they engaged and killed the enemy. Their adversaries, however, also inflicted numerous casualties before disappearing into the countryside to fight another day.

With grit and determination, Humphries and his men persisted in repeatedly striking out over the same blood-soaked ground. If they fared poorly at times, it was because they often fell into impossible situations not of their making. Lacking accurate and timely intelligence of enemy locations, Humphries's company, along with others, regularly stumbled into ambushes. Units sent to rescue beleaguered troops slipped into similar traps. Time after time, air and artillery support extricated soldiers lured into fierce firefights. This support gave the Americans a decisive edge over the Communists, although at times the material cost of this enormous firepower seemed wasteful. Tons of bombs and artillery shells rained down upon the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, often producing meager results. Once, during an assault on the village of Nhi Ha, a Communist stronghold, the Americans launched well over sixty sorties in ten days, with F–4 Phantoms and other aircraft dropping napalm and 500-pound bombs in run after run. After the bombardment American units entered the hamlet, only to confront a ferocious artillery barrage from a well-entrenched foe skilled in blunting the effectiveness of American air and artillery fire.

Confrontations with the Communists eventually became "monotonously repetitive" to Humphries and his men. Spotting a sniper, the company would dispatch an advance party to ferret him out. By the time the men arrived, the shooter would have gone. Thus, a lone sniper "had single-handedly stopped a U.S. rifle company in its tracks." "Searching for the enemy" also became "a never-ending theme" for the unit, as it often chanced upon squads of enemy soldiers only to have them vanish into the jungle. Despite the frustrations of such fighting, Humphries remained an exceptional combat leader throughout his first tour in Vietnam, which ended when an exploding mine blinded his right eye.[1]

Blessed with the ability to size up the battlefield quickly and the intuition to sense when danger neared, Humphries handled his outfit competently at all times. While determined to win battles, he always strove to protect his men and deployed them prudently. He also respected and cared for them, showing anger, frustration, and even guilt at the loss of any soldier. In addition, Humphries proved willing to challenge superiors when their actions might needlessly endanger the lives of his troops. These are the qualities of a fine combat officer.

While Humphries's military leadership deserves praise, the type of warfare portrayed in this book only highlights the limitations of American military strategy in the Vietnam War. The United States sought to wear down and destroy the enemy with superior firepower, mobility, and numbers. Yet, as Humphries's book amply proves, the strategy proved difficult to apply in the mountainous jungles and heavy forests of South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong refused to fight on American terms. Forsaking conventional combat for guerrilla tactics, they harassed American units like Humphries's rifle company with ambushes or attacks from fortified positions, while stubbornly avoiding most protracted battles. Consequently, the war became a test of endurance; the outcome hinged on which of the two sides could longer sustain its willingness to bear hardship and suffer casualties.

Given the history of Vietnam between 1945 and 1964, which American military leaders largely discounted, the odds of eventual victory in such an endurance contest were against the Americans. The Communists had already triumphed in a long, bitter war in North Vietnam against the French, a tough foe bolstered by American money and arms. Following the French withdrawal, they had bedeviled the hapless South Vietnamese Army for several years and were on the verge of routing it when the Americans intervened in 1965. From 1965 to 1968 the Communists had repeatedly stymied American military might and showed few signs of abandoning the struggle. Militarily and politically, the Communists had sufficient fortitude to outlast the United States in this war of attrition. For our opponents, victory in the field counted for less than

diminishing if not destroying the American will to fight, which is what happened after the Tet offensive in 1968. Yet until then, American military and political leaders, ignoring the evidence of stalemate on the battlefield, mounting casualty lists, and deepening opposition over the war at home, persisted in this flawed strategy, squandering the lives of many young men like those who fought and died with Captain Humphries. Knowing the outcome made reading this story of valiant men fighting for a beleaguered cause a poignant experience.

NOTES

1. The quoted words in the first, fourth, and fifth sentences of this paragraph are on pages 155, 156, and 196, respectively.

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Book Review
by Diana M. Holland

After Desert Storm
The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait
by Janet A. McDonnell
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
U.S. Army Center of Military History
1999, 302 pp., paper, $21

After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait is a well-written narrative about the complicated rebuilding effort undertaken by the United States Army following the Gulf War. It is overdue because quite a number of histories and personal accounts have been published about the offensive phase of the war but few have addressed the massive effort to rebuild Kuwait. Fortunately, Janet McDonnell, who was a historian with the Corps of Engineers, has written the story of that unrecognized part of the Gulf War and, in so doing, has pointed out the numerous "lessons learned" for those who are concerned about the Army's role in nation building and humanitarian assistance.

The author's main argument is that the Army performed a monumental task when it rebuilt Kuwait in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Dr. McDonnell presents a masterful account of how the Corps of Engineers—soldiers and civilians—and its contractors rebuilt quickly all of the critical components necessary to ensure the survival of the Kuwaiti people and the political stability of the government. Furthermore, she conveys effectively that the mission was accomplished in spite of bureaucratic squabbling, lobbying by special interest groups, and cultural differences between Americans and Kuwaitis.

The book's greatest strength is revealed in the extensively researched and well-documented account of the massive reconstruction missions. Using numerous interviews, after action reports, and other primary documents, Dr. McDonnell illustrates how the Corps repaired or rebuilt roads, sanitation systems, communication networks, and government offices and extinguished the devastating oil fires. But her account goes beyond the missions themselves; the author also discusses the complex contracting and purchasing processes that had to be negotiated so that the Army could complete its work. After reading her story, it is hard to imagine how the Kuwaitis could have accomplished any reasonable stability or normalcy had it not been for the management and construction skills of the U.S. Army.

The engineer effort is even more impressive when understood in the context of the many challenges and obstacles that emerged during the planning and execution phases of the mission. Some of the most eye-opening challenges involved the conflicts between and within government agencies. Members of the Army staff resisted the efforts of State Department officials to give the Army a role in rebuilding Kuwait after the war. This bureaucratic conflict intensified when senior civilian Pentagon officials supported the State Department's position and the Army's leadership continued to defy this policy. The author provides us with an example of how such conflict can affect the

lives of soldiers: twelve reserve soldiers were mobilized and demobilized several times within a month because of this battle between agencies.

An additional challenge in the planning stage of the mission was the Army's reluctance to plan anything beyond the offensive phase. McDonnell argues that Army leaders viewed victory as the end rather than the beginning of another phase. An important lesson learned is that the Army must develop a vision and doctrine for the potential postwar mission.

The author also describes some of the cultural differences between Americans and Kuwaitis that hindered the mission. One of those differences became apparent during the emergency recovery phase. American engineers needed timely decisions from Kuwaiti representatives in order to accomplish critical tasks. However, the Kuwaitis did not have the same level of urgency as did the Americans. This proved to be a source of frustration for U.S. soldiers, who were trying to help the Kuwaiti people. Ultimately, because of the flexibility and innovation of the Corps of Engineers, the United States was very successful in the reconstruction mission.

The author also addresses the reconstruction mission in the larger humanitarian and strategic framework. In this discussion the reader learns that Dr. McDonnell endorses the Army's role as nation builders in the 1990s and beyond. Unfortunately, her enthusiasm for this controversial policy ultimately detracts from her narrative and raises questions about our country's decision to undertake the mission at all.

The author's support of nation building surfaces in several places throughout her book. One of the more subtle examples is when she characterizes those who debated the Kuwait reconstruction mission in 1990. She describes members of the Army staff as "reluctant" (p. 22) to support the mission and then, once it was forced upon them, as reluctant to take the lead. On the other hand, she labels those who supported the operation as "men of vision and action." (p.17) To her credit she mentions briefly the reasons for the Army's "tepid response" (p.17) to the reconstruction assignment, including fear of an endless, nonmilitary mission and the desire to redeploy soldiers after the fighting ended. Generally, however, the reader gets the sense that the author views those "reluctant" generals as short-sighted and unwilling to recognize political reality.

To further her argument in favor of nation building, Dr. McDonnell compares the Kuwaiti mission to another famous nation-rebuilding operation, the Marshall Plan. The comparison is only partly successful. The Marshall Plan and the Kuwait case were similar in that both were efforts to prevent anti-Western or anticapitalist forces from taking control in the aftermath of war. Both were undertaken in the name of preserving democracy. But McDonnell's account reveals the enormous benefits that American enterprise gained as a result of the Kuwait mission. Furthermore, her description of American businesses battling for a piece of the postwar operation reinforces a view that this was an attractive economic opportunity. The Kuwaitis had $100 billion available to finance reconstruction, and American businesses were anxious to benefit. In contrast, European governments after World War II did not have the ability to finance reconstruction and had to accept loans from the United States in order to rebuild. It is unclear from *After Desert Storm* whether or not economic opportunism was the most important motivation for the reconstruction mission. The author, however, so frequently mentions that the Kuwaitis paid the bill and that American businesses benefited that the reader cannot help but wonder what drove the initial decision.

Overall, this is a superb narrative about the humanitarian successes of the Corps of Engineers. Regardless of the politics behind these types of operations, there is no doubt that a great deal of satisfaction may be derived from providing fresh water, food, and medical care to people in need. Military and civilian engineers have witnessed children's smiles in numerous operations in the 1990s. These rewarding experiences kept the Corps of Engineers motivated in a decade that was riddled with uncertainty for the armed forces. Janet McDonnell deserves great credit for writing this history of the Corps in action.

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